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DDAS Accident Report 
 
Accident details 
Report date: 15/05/2006 Accident number: 212 
Accident time: 09:00 Accident Date: 14/08/1998 
Where it occurred: Voznica, Praca village, 
15k from Pale, 
Bosanko 
Country: Bosnia Herzegovina 
Primary cause: Other (?) Secondary cause: Other (?) 
Class: Handling accident Date of main report: 16/08/1998 
ID original source: EB/TH/NH Name of source: BiH MAC 
Organisation: Name removed  
Mine/device: grenade Ground condition: grass/grazing area 
hard 
metal scrap 
rocks/stones 
Date record created: 15/02/2004 Date  last modified: 16/03/2004 
No of victims: 1 No of documents: 2 
 
Map details 
Longitude:  Latitude:  
Alt. coord. system:  Coordinates fixed by:  
Map east:  Map north:  
Map scale:  Map series:  
Map edition:  Map sheet:  
Map name:   
 
Accident Notes 
victim ill (?) 
inadequate medical provision (?) 
protective equipment not worn (?) 
 
1 
Accident report 
The demining group appear to have been using a one-man drill and one-man teams at the 
time of the accident. 
A Board of Inquiry report was ordered by the country MAC and carried out by representatives 
of the regional MACs and an ex-pat Technical Advisor. The report was made available and 
the following summarises its content. The original BoI report (edited for anonymity) is 
reproduced under Related papers at the “Other documents” tab. 
A [demining group] team at the time had 39 members, including cooks and medics. The team 
completed training on 15th April 1998. Its members had "extensive experience of demining 
from wartime mine and demolition activities". The rest of the team had been sent elsewhere 
and a "section" left at the task where the accident occurred. The site was in a mountainous 
region with grazing and agricultural land. It was on the edge of the village beside a football 
pitch and between a road and a river. The site was flat and covered with sparse grasses with 
hard soil with stones and metal contamination. 
At 08:30 the team started work. The victim was clearing the central lane of three lanes 25 
metres from each other. Vegetation was sparse where he was working and surface munitions 
or mines could have been easily seen. The victim had made three excavations prior to the 
accident but they were not of a size to indicate that anything had been found. 
At 09:00 an explosion occurred and the victim was seriously injured. He was found lying on 
his face with half of his end-of-lane marker stick under him and half behind him. The medic 
attended him "and removed his denture" and he was taken to Sarajevo hospital.  
The victim had suffered the amputation of his right hand, wrist and lower portion of his right 
arm. He also suffered two fragment penetrations to his head. One was "above his right ear 
and the other appeared to be a superficial neck wound. These fragments were later found to 
have lodged inside his head, one close to the spine at the base and the other centrally in his 
skull. "His visor was smoked and full of blood" but his helmet was still on his head. 
En-route to the hospital the ambulance was in collision with a sheep on the road and was 
delayed by roadworks in a tunnel. The casualty remained unconscious throughout the 
journey. 
The device involved was identified as a Dinama hand grenade. An unspecified number of 
fragments were collected and the identification independently confirmed. The victim's sand-
bag (used for scrap metal and contaminated soil) and a large stone had been placed "in the 
immediate area of the blast". 
The victim's protective wear was examined and it was found that marks on the helmet 
indicated the direction of fragment travel. Soil "identical to the soil colour" in the remains of 
the victim's sandbag was also on his helmet. The victims visor was "extensively" penetrated 
on the same side as the helmet marks. The victims frag-jacket had taken several strikes in the 
same area as the helmet and the fragments were held inside the jacket. A photograph in the 
file showed a single penetration to the armour just below the collar. [The researcher also 
examined and photographed the armour in June 1999.] 
The locally made grenade was fired by striking the grenade striker onto a hard object (such as 
the stone by the victim's bag) This drives the striker onto the "detonator and delay fuse" and 
after a 4.5 second delay the device explodes. 
The investigators found that it was not possible to prod to a depth of more than "3 to 4 cm" at 
the site. 
The detector used was the MineLab F1A4 and it was found that there were "3 to 4" readings 
in every square meter. The team had been on site for "many weeks" and had found a hand 
grenade with tripwire attached, two PMR-2A fragmentation mines with tripwires (one attached 
to a beer bottle), a three grenade "booby trap", a PMA-3 blast mine, a 60mm rifle grenade 
and a Soviet grenade with fuse. In adjacent areas, four civilian casualties had been reported 
since the war. 
The investigators felt that some details of the victim's personal life were relevant. They 
mentioned that he had separated from his wife who had taken his children abroad. He had a 
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girlfriend (the team cook) who may have been "flirting" with other men. His children visited 
"recently" and after they left the victim's character "changed considerably". He was reported 
to have suggested "bringing munitions to the site to "improve" the clearance figures of the 
team" and to have said "that an injury could give him some money". 
 
Conclusion 
The investigators concluded that the device had exploded in the victim's right hand while 
"held at an angle above and to the right hand side of his head". The victim must have been 
lying down at the time. 
They decided that he "either found the grenade or 'imported'" it to the site. The evidence 
pointed towards the grenade having been brought to the site and deliberately detonated 
[although the investigators stop short of saying this – possibly because to do so would have 
invalidated insurance]. 
 
Recommendations 
The investigators recognised the personal and professional pressures that deminers can 
suffer and recommended a "close watch" be kept for evidence of such stress and that 
sufferers be redeployed "until fit to return to hazardous operations". 
Among other recommendations, they suggested liaison with the police over priority at traffic-
lights for tunnels [which had delayed evacuation], that managers ensure that ambulance 
drivers do not drive at excessive speed, and that the ambulance should be "on site" while 
work is under way [the recommendation implies that it was not]. 
 
Victim Report 
Victim number: 274 Name: Name removed 
Age:  Gender: Male 
Status: deminer  Fit for work: DECEASED 
Compensation: not made available Time to hospital: 35 minutes 
Protection issued: Frag jacket 
Helmet 
Short visor 
Protection used: Frag jacket, Helmet, 
Short visor 
 
Summary of injuries: 
INJURIES 
severe Head 
AMPUTATION/LOSS 
Arm Below elbow 
FATAL 
COMMENT 
Victim died after four days in a coma. See medical report. 
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Medical report 
A brief medic's report stated that the victim was "pierce through the temple" and that to 
prevent suffocation he removed his "dental prosthesis". He bandaged the right arm below the 
elbow with sterile elastic bandage, and also put sterile bandages on the head wounds. On 
arrival at hospital the "doctor sent me to check the blood group of the victim". He helped move 
the victim for X-ray after which the victim was taken to intensive care. 
One of the investigators reported [in person] having visited the victim in hospital and having 
been shown the X-ray where fragments inside the skull were visible. The doctor anticipated 
death in 3-5 days, and the victim died on the fourth day after the accident without regaining 
consciousness. The investigator suspected that the event was deliberate, and the extent of 
the injury unintended. 
 
Analysis 
The primary cause of this accident is listed as "Other" because it seems that it was not an 
unintended event. From the evidence in the report, it seems likely that the victim deliberately 
detonated the grenade with the intent of losing his hand and getting a compensation payment 
that would "solve" some of his problems. It seems likely that he was trying to shield himself 
behind the sandbag and turned his head away defensively - ironically exposing the 
unprotected part of his head and neck to the fragments that killed him.  
His helmet was on, fastened and with the visor down. Had he been attempting suicide, it is 
likely that he would have removed his helmet and held the grenade close to his face.  
 
Related papers 
Other documents in the Accident file included a detailed map of the area, a sketch map of the 
site, photographs of the accident site and the victim's equipment, and statements from the 
personnel involved. These were not made available for copying. 
 
Original BoI report 
The original BoI report (edited for anonymity) is reproduced below. 
Report of the Investigation into the Mine Incident in the Praca Area on 14th August 
1998 
Introduction 
1 A mine incident occurred on the morning of 14th August in the village of Praca in 
an area that had been mined during the recent conflict.  A [demining group] deminer was 
seriously injured while taking part of a team clearance operation being conducted in a field 
close to several houses that are to be utilised as part of the [demining group’s parent 
organisation] repatriation programme.  The deminer, [name excised] suffered a traumatic 
amputation of the right hand and wounds to the right side of the head.   
2 The Board of Inquiry (B of I) was convened on the 15th August and the 
investigation were completed on 17th August 1998.  The Board members are detailed in the 
Terms of Reference for the Board of Inquiry at Annex A.   
3 The Board staff were met at the site by the [demining group] management and 
team members and every assistance was given to help the board to complete its task.  Also 
present were the local police from Praca who also conducted an investigation.  The board has 
agreed to give the Praca police team copies of the investigation report in order to assist them 
in their investigation.  
The [demining group] Teams and Team Number Four 
4 [The demining group] has six teams, two in the Republika Srpska and four in the 
Federation.  The teams consist of 39 members, including interpreters, cooks and medics and 
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are totally self contained.  The teams are under the control of the new Entity Mine Action 
Centres for operational and administrational aspects, but the selection of priority tasks are the 
sole responsibility of [demining group parent organisation].  The Federation teams were 
trained in Tuzla (including Team Number Four) and undertook training between March and 
April 1998.  The particularly hazardous conditions of mine clearance operations are well 
known to Team Number Four who have extensive experience of demining from wartime mine 
and demolition’s activities. 
5 Team Four completed its training on the 15 April and was operationally tasked to 
undertake work, in the Praca area.  They started work on two tasks, one to clear a road to a 
small spring and clearance of a large field close by where the accident occurred on the 14 
August.  
6 The Team was reduced to section strength recently as the task in this field did 
not require the full compliment of the team.   The main contingent of Team Four were recently 
re-tasked to a site near Ilijas. 
EMAC SOPs 
7 The Entity MAC Standing Operating Procedures (SOPs), which are the rules and 
regulations utilised by the [demining group] teams, are the standard UN MAC (now BHMAC) 
SOPs.  All members of the [demining group] teams have previously passed recognised 
demining qualification training on a basic demining training course organised and conducted 
by the then (UNMAC). 
Sequence, Documentation and Procedures of Tasking 
8 The tasks in this area were identified by the [demining group] staff and the 
Regional Officer of the EMAC.  Limited information is available about the mined areas and 
mine and munitions types used in the area, but some sketches and records were obtained 
from the BHMAC Data Base.  These sketches were available, and formed part of the 
standard tasking folder. 
9 The final agreement to undertake work is authorised by the Demining Co-
ordinator [name excised], who in discussion with the Federation MAC will agree extensions 
and alterations to the original tasking order.   There is no information of mine or UXO 
contamination in the area of the field where the accident occurred, but local personnel had 
insisted that mine and munitions were believed to be there.  Furthermore the field, which is at 
the edge of the village, has not been utilised and would form part of grazing and/or 
agricultural land for several houses due to be reconstructed in the near future.  This field was 
therefore included as an operational task and given the ID Number of 1289. 
Priority  
10 The priority of this task was high due to the fact that spring water was required 
for the houses in the immediate area, and the field for grazing or sustenance farming for the 
present local personnel and for the imminent return of refugees. 
Geography 
11 Praca is to the east of Sarajevo, some 15 kilometres from the village of Pale.  It 
is in the Federation area near the Inter Entity Boundary Line (IEBL).  Praca is in a 
mountainous region set in a pleasant valley, which is small and flat with grazing and 
agricultural land in the valley and on the sides of the mountains. The roads, two run through 
the village, are tarmac single lanes (two way) from Pale and heading in a south easterly 
direction to Gorazde.  The village has the river Praca running close too the road through the 
village.  The task site is on the edge of the village next to the village football pitch with a road 
on one side and the river on the other.  See attached map at Annex B. 
Ground Conditions in the Praca Area 
12 An evaluation of the ground conditions at the task site in Praca area was 
conducted by the board. The site is flat, grass covered, the soil is of poor quality and the 
vegetation sparse.  The soil is extremely difficult to prod due to the hardness of the soil, and 
also consists of a large quantity of small stones, and has considerable metal contamination, 
which makes clearance by prodding and detectors slow and extremely difficult.    
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Equipment and Tools Used 
13 During the investigation the standard methods of mine and munitions 
detection/location being used by the team in the Praca area were investigated.  The following 
comments are made: 
a Prodding Tests - Prodding tests were conducted in order to establish the ground 
conditions in the area and to determine the depth to which prodding activities might have 
been successful during previous clearance operations. The tests, which could not penetrate 
more than a 3 to 4 cm depth, confirmed that the prodder could not penetrate the ground to an 
adequate depth without excavation.   
b Metal Detector Tests. – The Metal Detector used on the site is the MineLab 
F1A4.  The site has considerable metal contamination and the deminers are on average 
required to investigate more than 3 to 4 metal soundings in ever metre of area. 
14 This site relies mainly on the metal detector and when metal items are found, 
they use the prodder and trowel to excavate the immediate area. 
The Mine Threat in the Praca Area 
15 The area around Praca was held by the Serbs until the Dayton Peace Accord 
when it was agreed that it formed part of the pocket of land from Sarajevo to Gorazde.  It is 
believed that this land was mined as the Serb forces withdrew from the area but this has not 
been confirmed.  Some records clearly indicate that minefield areas to the North contain or 
contained (they have yet to be surveyed) PMR-2A fragmentation mines. 
16 The team has been on this site for many weeks and has to date found and 
destroyed the following mines and munitions: 
a One Hand Grenade with an Instant Fuze attached to a tripwire 
b One PMR –2A Fragmentational Mine with standard tripwire attachment 
c One PMR 2A Fragmentational Mine attached to a beer bottle by tripwire 
d Three grenades in a glass bottle rigged as a Booby Trap 
e One PMA 3 Blast Mine partially buried 
f One rifle grenade 60 mm 
g One USSR Grenade complete with a fuze from the same type of grenade close 
by 
17 There are many other sites, which are believed to be mines in the Praca area. 
Previous Work in the Area 
18 The immediate area has not had demining teams undertake clearance tasks 
previously, with the one exception of the village football pitch, which is reported to have been 
cleared by an Italian IFOR contingent.  
Previous Accidents in the Area 
19 There are several sites adjacent to this area that have had four reported mine 
related incidents to local personnel since the war. 
Events Leading to the Accident 
20 There are no known special problems on the site that warrant recording but the 
personal situation of [the Victim] requires considerable attention.  From the statements 
several important aspects about his personal life and recent comments are the cause of some 
concern and certainly reflect on his possible mental state.  The main points are: 
a He was separated, (possibly divorced) around five years ago and his ex-wife and 
their two children moved to Sweden. 
b He has been living with a female (who also acts as the team cook), but 
relationships have been rather tense recently with frequent arguments.  It is reported that she 
has flirted with at least two other men in the last few weeks. 
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c The two children visited recently, and have since returned to Sweden.  Since 
their return his character has changed considerably.  [The victim] has, since this time been 
argumentative with his fellow team members and made several unusual statements including: 
i)  Bringing munitions on site to improve the munitions performance 
ii)  Claiming that an injury could give him some money 
The Accident 
21  An explosion occurred at about 09:00 hours, at the start of the central lane, in 
which [the victim] working.  [The victim] was seriously injured. 
22 During the clearance operations the team had a medical orderly on site with full 
equipment.  A full casualty procedure was immediately activated and Basic Life Support 
given.  The casualty was carried out of the mined area to the medic who was waiting on the 
roadside.  First aid was administered and the casualty was rapidly evacuation to the local 
hospital.  The CASEVAC was conducted well and took less than 35 minutes from the incident 
to arrival at the hospital in Sarajevo. 
Site Investigation 
23 Statements were taken from all involved personnel, the statements confirmed 
that normal demining activities were being conducted.  The entrance to the site was clearly 
marked and had been ‘closed off’ in accordance with Technical Guidelines in preparation for a 
site investigation.   The site was very clearly marked and in complete accordance with SOPs.  
It was easy to understand the site clearance procedures, work in progress, admin areas etc, 
due to good and clear marking.   
24 An area in the central portion of the field were being cleared, and three new 'cut 
lanes' had started that morning.  The three deminers were 25 metres apart and being 
supervised by one section leader from the 'visitors lane' some 25 metres from the 
intermediate lane.  This is in accordance with standard procedures and on this site was 
conducted entirely correctly. 
25 The central lane of the three was being undertaken by [the victim] who was using 
the standard equipment of the [demining group] teams, consisting of a Mine Detector, 
prodder, shears, trowels etc.  The area has very sparse vegetation and any mine or munitions 
laid on the surface or partially buried would be easily seen. 
26 The accident area was checked by deminers using prodders and mine detectors 
before the team conducted the site investigation.  The incident occurred some 1.0 metre from 
the edge of the intermediate lane.  See Annex C for the accident site sketch    
27 The accident site consisted of one metre by approximately one metre which was 
the area from the intermediate lane, where work started that morning to the extent of work 
completed by [the victim] before the accident occurred.  This area, see attached photographs 
at Annex ….. clearly show three small holes where investigation for metal readings had been 
undertaken.   
28 The amount of metal in the Hand Grenade (see paragraph     ) [space in original] 
would be very easily identified by the use of a Metal Detector.  If an item of ordnance had 
been found the procedures are clearly detailed in the SOPs that the deminer is to stop work 
and inform the Team or Section Leader.  On no account are the munitions to be moved. 
 29 None of the holes indicate that a mine or munitions has been removed which 
would be clearly evident by the irregular wall on the far side of the excavation hole.  It is 
assumed, but cannot be confirmed that the (Dynamo) Hand Grenade was not buried, based 
on this evidence.  
Investigation of the Blast - Ground, Jacket and Helmet 
30 A close investigation of the ground and the sandbag used by [the victim] to 
contain soil removed for excavation holes, and positioned in the immediate area of his body, 
revealed that the sandbag was close to the blast as it was considerably damaged by the 
blast.  The bag also contained at the top a large stone the size of a clenched fist.  
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31 The helmet had several fragments or fragment indentations to the right side and 
fragment scruff marks on the right side.  The direction and angle of the fragments could 
therefore be clearly identified.   The helmet also has soil blast marks on the right side that are 
identical to the soil colour found in the sandbag, and there is a blackish mark beside the soil 
marks that indicate possible explosive burn.  The visor that is attached to the helmet also has 
extensive fragments and fragment indentations on the right side in the immediate area of 
those found in the helmet.  See attached photographs at Annex   .  
32 The Flak or protection jacket has fragment penetration of the outer layer of the 
jacket and several fragments are contained inside the jacket held by the protective layers.  
These fragments, holes and scruff marks are on the right side below the fragments of the 
helmet and visor and on the top of the right shoulder.  There are no marks on the back, front 
or below the shoulder on the jacket at all, clearly indicating the area of the blast and 
fragmentation direction.  
Identification of the Munition  
33 The Sarajevo Bomb Squad has unofficially agreed with the identification of the 
board.  This identification is based on several fragments retrieved from the accident site that 
are very similar to those of the Dinama type hand grenade.  These grenades were made in 
their thousands during the war period. The normal method of activation of this grenade is to 
remove the safety cap/cover to expose the striker mechanism at the top of the grenade. The 
action of striking the grenade striker onto a hard object, drives the striker onto the detonator 
and delay fuze, which burns for about 4.5 seconds before the base detonator explodes, 
initiating the main charge.  On detonation the explosive blast drives a multitude of metal 
fragments omni-directional and at high velocity.  
Medical Assessment of [the victim] 
34 An interview was conducted with [medical doctor, name excised] to ascertain the 
condition and the extent of the wounds. The Doctor confirmed that [the victim] had lost his 
right hand ,wrist and lower portion of the arm. In addition he had two fragments that had 
entered the right side of the head, one was located the central left side of the skull the other 
on the central spine location below the skull.  The point of entry was from the right side above 
and forward of the right ear the other entry point was below the right ear.    
Assessment of the Explosion based on the evidence. 
35 An assessment of the physical damage to [the victim’s] hand, arm and head, and 
the protective equipment, including the sandbag on the site, and the munition type, indicate 
the position of the person when the accident occurred.  It is evident, based on the blast and 
fragments, and the damage to the hand, lower arm and head that the explosion occurred 
while the grenade was in [the victim]'s right hand.  That his hand was close to the head and 
held at an angle above and to the right hand side of the head.  Based on the soil that was 
thrown at great speed, and covers the right side of the helmet and the blast damage to the 
sandbag the explosion also occurred in the immediate area of the sandbag. 
36 As there is no blast or fragment damage to the back, front, side or lower parts of 
the body this clearly indicates that the blast was contained in the immediate area of the head 
and shoulder. Due to this munition being an Omni-Directional type the position of the grenade 
was certainly held in a position that shielded the rest of [the victim]’s body, and that could only 
have been achieved if he was in the lying position.  
Sequence of Events on the 14 August 1998 
37 Account of activities prior to, during and after the accident. 
07:50 Roll call was held by  [name excised], the Team Leader (TL) at the Praca field 
base. Half of the Team were carrying out clearance operations in Ilijas, therefore only half of 
the Team personnel were present. The TL left on completion of the roll call to go to Ilijas 
leaving [name excised] the Survey Section Leader (SSL) in charge.  All was correct and there 
was nothing unusual on this morning. 
08:15 The Deminers arrived at the Command Post (CP) area in the car park adjacent 
to the minefield being cleared 1 kilometre from the field base.  Daily checks were carried out 
on equipment and the section leaders briefed their sections on the days work plan. 
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[Name excised] was the section Leader in charge of [the victim]. Her plan for that morning 
was to start three parallel lanes 25 meters apart. 
[Three named deminers] would be in the rest area waiting to be first relief. 
[Name excised] (SSL) checked radio communications with the Sarajevo Regional Office and 
informed the SL’s they could proceed with demining. 
[Name excised] (SL) went through final checks with her deminers and ordered them into the 
field. She then started to inspect the site. 
08:30 The Deminers started work in their respective clearance lanes. [The Section 
Leader] walked along the visitors lane 25 meters back from the deminers at their base line 
checking the pickets and marking system. 
08:30 – 08:50 [The victim], as observed by the Deminers working in the lanes on 
either side of him, was seen to be working normally with a MineLab detector and prodder. 
Neither of the deminers took much notice of what he was doing because nothing about his 
actions seemed in any way different from usual. 
The medic and ambulance would have normally been in the CP 100 meters from the 
clearance work but at this point they were in the field base 1 kilometre away refilling water 
canteens 
08:55 An explosion was heard and smoke was seen in lane 2. [The Section Leader] 
was at the road approximately 50 meters away from lane 2. She immediately initiated a 
CASEVAC over the VHF radio shouted to the other deminers and ran through the safe lanes 
to lane 2. They thought at first it was a training exercise. She also verbally called [name 
excised] from the rest area to assist.  
All work stopped and the deminers went to the rest area.  The medic and ambulance driver  
responded immediately and drove to a point as close to lane 2 as possible without leaving the 
tarmac road. The trip took less than five minutes and the ambulance stopped approximately 
100 meters from lane 2. 
[The Section Leader] and [Name excised] arrived at the casualty seconds after the explosion 
to find [the victim] laying face down,  half in his clearance lane with his legs in the base lane. 
His left arm was under his body and his right doubled under his right shoulder. 
The base stick was broken in two with half behind the casualty and the other half under him. 
There was a work glove on his left hand. His tools and detector were behind him still in the 
base lane. There was a part filled, part destroyed sandbag under him, half was in un-cleared 
land. 
Together they pulled him back into the base lane and turned him over. 
His right hand was gone from just above his wrist. His visor was smoked and full of blood. 
They removed his helmet and saw there was a bleeding wound above his right ear and what 
looked like a superficial wound on the right side of his neck.  The casualty was unconscious 
and his breathing was ragged and erratic. 
[Name excised] was told to go and get the stretcher. He ran to the ambulance and returned 
with the stretcher and [another deminer].  The casualty was quickly laid on the stretcher and 
carried to the medic at the ambulance.  The medic, [name excised], took the casualty’s flak 
jacket off. He checked his airways and removed a set of dentures, he also pulled the 
casualties tongue out to give a clear air passage. The casualty on the stretcher was loaded 
into the back of the ambulance and left for the hospital with the medic and four deminers to 
assist. 
09:00 – 09:35 The ambulance hit and killed a sheep between the site and the 
tunnel.  The ambulance was delayed at the tunnel into Pale for five minutes waiting for a 
green light but the journey to Kosevo Hospital was completed in 35 minutes which is 10 
minutes less than usual. 
The casualty was unconscious throughout the journey. 
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09:15 [Name excised] (SSL) checked with the other Deminers that no one else was 
injured and then ordered the Demining site closed and sealed.  
09:30 [Name excised] (SSL) informed the local police of the accident.  
09:15-09:45 The Deminers removed all their equipment to the field base, Deminers were 
detailed as guards to ensure no one entered the site. The site was sealed and guarded until 
the investigation team arrived the next day. 
10:00 [Name excised] the Regional Officer (RO) arrived and inspected the accident 
area with the SSL. They approached to within a few meters of the explosion site but did not 
change any thing. 
The RO took personal charge of the helmet, flak jacket, tools and detector. He interviewed 
each of the Deminers separately and took personal statements from them. He remained on 
site until the investigation team arrived the next day. 
12:00 Approximately IPTF arrived on site and carried out a brief investigation. 
Assessment of the Statements made by the Primary Witnesses 
38 The statements clearly indicate that [the victim] was under tremendous pressure 
from his personal life, which seems to have changed his normally placid character to being 
aggressive and argumentative and making statements that were totally unacceptable to other 
team members. 
39 The Section Leader, an old friend, had spoken to him on two separate occasions 
to try and get him to understand that he was being irrational.  Other team members had also 
spoken to him and the situation was certainly reaching a critical period. 
Summary 
39 This area of land is extremely difficult to demine.  Previous accidents, lack of 
detailed records and information and a site on which many items of munitions of an 
improvised type have been found make this site one to address with extreme caution.  
Prodder and Detector performance in this area are poor, due to the ground conditions, but 
this has nothing to do with the events of this accident. 
40 The accident occurred due to actions taken by [the victim] who either found the 
grenade buried or 'imported' the item to the site.  Evidence of the excavation holes indicates 
that it is unlikely that the grenade was buried but this cannot be proved.  Regardless of 
whether [the victim] found or imported the grenade he had at this point broken a number of 
critical safety rules. The body of [the victim] was certainly in the prone position when the 
grenade activated and this is not a position that is common or taught.  Driving the striker onto 
a hard object activates this grenade, and the large stone, which is an unusual object on the 
main part of this site, was in the top of the sandbag.   
41 There are two distinct options. 
a Option One.  If the grenade was buried, the lack of the normal reporting 
procedures when it was found, the removal, the holding of the grenade above the 
head while in the prone position and the self activation (due to unknown reasons of 
the grenade) make this a probable, if highly unlikely possibility. If this option is 
accepting the reason for the removal, holding the grenade, being in the lying the 
position and for the grenade to 'self' activate are difficult, if not impossible to explain. 
b Option Two.  The lack of evidence indicating the grenade was buried, not 
reporting the find of a munition, the availability of a 'striking' stone and lying in the 
prone position lead one to surmise that this could be the result of importing the 
grenade to the site, and the deliberate activation of the grenade. 
Conclusion 
The management, site organisation and conduct of operations were very good and the board 
made only complementary comments.  In respect of the accidence and in the light of the 
evidence, it is extremely difficult for the board not to come to the conclusion, that this accident 
was deliberately conceived and carried out.    
10 
Recommendations 
There are certainly tremendous physiological and mental pressures on many people after the 
recent events, but none of the board is trained to assess these particular aspects.  However 
demining and EOD has also tremendous pressures, and management must ensure that a 
close watch is maintained on all personnel involved in mine action.  This is to ensure that 
physiological and mental pressures are identified and members allowed to rest, take leave or 
be employed in less stress-related tasks until being fit to return to hazardous operations. 
Signed by the Board Members 
Signed by the two members of the Investigation Board.  The Observer signed merely to state 
that he was in attendance and not that he agreed or disagreed with the results of the inquiry 
or it’s conclusions. 
1 Technical Advisor to the Demining Commission 16 August 1998 
2 [Demining group] Programme Coordinator 16 August 1998 
3 [Demining group] acting as an Observer  16 August 1998 
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This document is on limited distribution, it should not be photocopied.  The following 
departments/personnel only are to receive a copy 
Federation Mine Action Centre 
BH Mine Action Centre 
Praca Police Department 
[Demining group] 
Additional copies should be sought from [the demining group]. 
 
11 
